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Gender Differences in Giving and the Anticipation Regarding Giving in Dictator Games

Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to...

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Gender Differences in Giving and the Anticipation Regarding Giving in Dictator Games

Research on altruistic behaviour and associated anticipatory beliefs, as well as related gender differences, is limited. Using data from Chowdhury and Jeon, who vary a common show-up fee and incentivize recipients to...

Published by:
The Attack and Defense Mechanisms – Perspectives from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Jan 01, 0001
This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between the psychology / neuroscience research with that of economic...
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The Attack and Defense Mechanisms – Perspectives from Behavioral Economics and Game Theory
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Jan 01, 0001
This commentary complements the article by De Dreu and Gross (2019) from the perspectives of behavioral economics and game theory. It aims to provide a bridge between the psychology / neuroscience research with that of economic...
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The All-Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Oct 01, 2017
I model innovation contests as an all-pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out...
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The All-Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Oct 01, 2017
I model innovation contests as an all-pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out...
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A Generalized Tullock Contest
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests...
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Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion
We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or...
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“Small, yet Beautiful”
We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest....
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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests...
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A Generalized Tullock Contest
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests...
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Introduction to the Symposium - Contests

This Symposium consists of five studies in the area of “Contests.” These peer-reviewed papers were among a larger set of research presented at the 2016 conference “Contests: Theory and Evidence” at the University of East...

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The Hidden Perils of Affirmative Action
Contests are ubiquitous in economic, organizational and political settings. Contest designers often use tools to make a contest among asymmetric contestants more even, in order to either elicit higher effort levels, or for...
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Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying
We analyze a group political lobbying all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize, in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. We completely characterize all...
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“Small, yet Beautiful”
We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest....
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Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets
We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream platform market can make the...
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Molecular Imaging of Atherosclerosis
Molecular imaging of cardiovascular disease is a powerful clinical and experimental approach that can inform our understanding of atherosclerosis biology. Complementing cross-sectional imaging techniques that provide detailed...
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Effect of Iron Levels on Women After Premature or Early-Onset Menopause-Reply.
T Muka, R Chowdhury, OH Franco
Nov 29, 2018
Our study showed that the early onset of menopause is associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular disease and mortality. We agree with Hayes et al as well as Mascitelli and Goldstein that elevated iron levels observed...
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Exclusivity and exclusion on platform Markets
We examine conditions under which an exclusive license granted by the upstream producer of a component that some consumers regard as essential to one of two potential suppliers of a downstream platform market can make the...
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Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments
We revisit the meta-analysis of Sheremeta on overbidding in contest experiments and focus on the effect of endowment on overbidding. Sheremeta assumes, and finds evidence of, an increasing linear relationship between endowment...
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