Quality Improvement Incentive Strategy in Agricultural Products Supply Chain Under Social Preference

Yanhong Qin, Kai Guo

OAI: oai:igi-global.com:287569 • DOI: 10.4018/JOEUC.287569

This paper sets Stackelberg model of bilateral quality efforts decision dominated by supermarket in the agricultural products supply chain by considering fairness concern and altruistic reciprocity. We use backward induction method to compute and prove that A3P’ fairness concern can play the role of profit distribution mechanism in agricultural products supply chain, and has no effect on the bilateral quality efforts decision, total profit of supply chain and objective efficiency, but can improve both the subjective and objective fairness degree. Meanwhile, supermarket’s altruistic reciprocity can improve the total quality efforts and total profit of supply chain, optimize the objective efficiency and subjective fairness of supply chain.

End-User Computing Social Sciences and Humanities Human Aspects of Technology