Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government

Xincai Ye, Lin Miao

OAI: oai:igi-global.com:315315 • DOI: 10.4018/JOEUC.315315

The continuous upsurge of tourism consumption activities has promoted economic development, but at the same time, it has also produced numerous problems, such as low-quality service and high admission prices at scenic spots, which are not conducive to the sustainable development of tourism. In this paper, in view of the phenomenon of low-quality service of scenic spots, a three-party evolutionary game model of scenic spots, tourists, and government is constructed under the participation of tourists and the reward-subsidy mechanism and punishment mechanism, and a simulation analysis is performed using the NetLogo platform. The results show that, under the reward-subsidy and punishment mechanisms, the service strategy selection of scenic spots will eventually evolve to provide high-quality services, tourists will eventually choose the no-complaint strategy, and the government will eventually evolve to provide active supervision.