Ontological Destruction of the Kantian Critique of the Paralogism of Rational Psychology

Michel Henry

In Kant, remarkably, and for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, theproblem of the Ego receives an ontological signification. The critique of theparalogisms of rational psychology concerns, explicitly, this fundamental problemof the being of the ego. Kant’s examination of this problem constitutes an essentialmoment of the history of modern philosophy. This examination results finally inthe complete failure (échec total) to determine such a being, a failure that Kantattempts to pass off ultimately as a metaphysical impossibility. This is affirmedconstantly through the labyrinthine analysis of the Transcendental Dialectic: whatemerges from its difficulties, and obscurities, is that the being of the Ego can beneither determined (circonscrit), nor posited, metaphysically. The conclusion isunquestionably the following: the ego cogito does not contain in itself any sum, atleast if, by the latter, one intends, as does rational psychology, the metaphysicaland, in some way, absolute being of the ‘I’ (l’Ego).