Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Jay Pil Choi, Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Jaesoo Kim

OAI: oai:purehost.bath.ac.uk:publications/34101087-e8cc-484a-bc01-58cdae9f7741 • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12152

We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.